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jury? The majority of states hold that in the physical absence of
the defendant, his counsel cannot waive his "right" to be present. 17
One state has clear-cut decisions holding the exact opposite: that is,
an attorney may waive a defendant's presence.' 8 However, the prevailing view seems to be that the defendant must expressly relinquish a
"right" before he can be understood to waive it and no presumption
will be made in favor of a waiver.19 Indiana follows this latter rule in
the case at hand by refusing to accept a waiver of the accused's presence without his express consent.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
INSURANCE

DECLARED INTERSTATE COMMERCE

Nearly 200 private stock fire insurance companies formed a combination, operating in six southern states, to fix agents' commissions
and to fix non-competitive premium rates, to be effected by boycotts
against persons purchasing insurance from non-members, by refusing
to allow agents representing non-member insurance companies to
represent them, and refusing the opportunity of re-insurance to nonmember companies. Members of the association were indicted for
alleged violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.' The District Court
dismissed the indictment. 2 The Supreme Court, in reversing this action held that "fire insurance transactions which stretch across state
lines constitute 'commerce among the several state'." United States
v. South Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
In Paul v. Virginia,s the Supreme Court announced that "the
business of insurance is not commerce," 4 and in the intervening years
17.

18.

19.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Waller v. State, 40 Ala. 325 (1865); Stroope v. State, 72 Ark. 379,
80 S.W. 749 (1904); Bonner v. State, 67 Ga. 510 (1881); State v.
Wilcoxen, 200 Iowa 1250, 206 N.W. 260 (1925); State v. Myrick,
38 Kan. 238, 16 Pac. 330 (1888); State v. Grisafulli, 135 Ohio St.
87, 19 N.E. (2d) 645 (1939); Schafer v. State, 118 Texas Cr. R.
500, 40 S.W. (2d) 147 (1931).
In Davidson v. State, 108 Ark. 191, 195, 158 S.W. 1103, 1107
(1913) the court said, "It is not essential to a valid waiver that
defendant should make the agreement in his own person. He may
do so through his own counsel, and, as before stated, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, authority to perform an act
in the progress of the trial, which counsel assume to do, will
be presumed." Accord, Nelson v. State, 190 Ark. 1027, 82 S.W. (2d)
619 (1935); Durham v. State, 179 Ark. 507, 16 S.W. (2d) 991
(1929); Schruggs v. State, 131 Ark. 320, 198 S.W. 694 (1917).
Biggs v. Lloyd, 70 Cal. 447 (1886); Commonwealth v. Andrews,
3 Mass. 126 (1807); French v. State, 85 Wis. 400, 55 N.W. 566
(1893).
26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 1-2.
51 F. Supp. 712 (194 ) See Legis. Note (1943) 32 Geo. L. J. 66.
8 Wall. (U.S.) 168 (1869).
See also, Liverpool and L. Life and F. Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 10 Wall. (U.S.) 566, (1870); Hooper v. California, 155
U.S. 648, (1894). Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 247 U.S. 132 (1918); Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935).
For a general collection of cases, see Gavit, The Commerce Clause

NOTES AND COMMENTS

the states have set up their own systems for the regulation of insurance companies operating within their borders. 5 With the instant
decision, the Supreme Court has cleared the way for feeeral control.
Already, a state law has been held invalid under this dEcision. 6
The dissenting opinion in the instant case is based on the theory
that merely entering into a contract cannot constitute an act of interstate commerce; 7 that neither the incidental use of the mails or other
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, nor the insurance of goods
moving in interstate commerce could bring the business of insurance
within federal control.
However, Mr. Justice Jackson, who wrote a separate opinion, dissenting in part, takes notice of the fact that there does not seem to
be "any satisfactory distinction between insurance business as now
conducted and other transactions that are held to constitute interstate
commerce. 8 "Were we considering the question for tha first time
and writing upon a clean slate, I would have no misgivings about
holding that insurance business is commerce and where conducted
across state lines is interstate commerce."
He bases his opinion on six principles:
1. Modern insurance business, as usually conducted, is commerce. 9
2. "For constitutional purposes a fiction has been established,
(1932) 134-139; Powell, Insurance as Commerce in Constitution
and Statute, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 937 (1944); Recent Decision (1944)
44 Col. L. Rev. 772.
5. Thirty-nine states joined as amicus curiae in a petition for a
rehearing. See 30, A. B. A. J. 580 (1944).
6. Ware v. Travelers Insurance Co., (U.S.D.C. Idaho, No. Dist., July
28, 1944), held a resident-agent law was an undue burden on
Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western U.
interstate commerce.
Telegraph Co., 96 U.S. 1, (1877), "The power of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce is exclusive in all cases where the
subject over which the power is exercised is in nature national,
or admits of one uniform system or plan of regulation. The
inaction of Congress upon such a subject is equivalent to a declaration that it shall be free from all state regulation or interference." Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1934).
7. See majority opinion, n. 50. "Whether reliance on Earlier statements of this Court in the Paul v. Virginia line of cases that insurance is not 'commerce' could ever be pleaded as a defense to a criminal prosecution under the Sherman Act is a question which has
been suggested but it is not necessary to discuss at this time."
The impact of monopoly upon the public conscious aess as disclosed in pamphlet, party platforms, and congressional debate is
effectively, set forth in the majority opinion, nn. 39-48. Burke,
Is the Business of Insurance Commerce? 42 Mich. L. Rev. 409
(1943).
8. International Textbook v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91, (190 1), where it
was held that sending a correspondence course through the mails
from one state to another constituted interstate commerce; United
States v. General Motors Corporation, 121 F. (2nd) 376 (1941),
and for a discussion of same see, Note (1942) 17 Ind. L. J. 255.
9. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 1, (1824), "Commerce undoubtedly is traffic, but it is something more; it is intercourse.
It describes the commercial intercourse between nations and parts
of nations in all its branches."
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and long acted upon by the ' Court, the states, and the Congress, that
insurance is not commerce. o
3. So long as Congress acquiesces, this Court should adhere to
the rule which sustains the regulation of insurance companies by the
states.
4. Congressional enactment on the subject is of presumptive constitutional validity.
5. Congress may, without exerting its full powers, prohibit acts
involving the insurance business "which substantially affect or unduly burden or restrain interstate commerce."
6. "The antitrust laws should be construed to reach the business
of insurance and those who are engaged in it only under the latter
congressional power."
Under this construction all combinations could be prosecuted if
they unreasonably restrain interstate commerce."l It would leave state
regulations intact. The lone act of conspiring to fix rates in several
2
states would be sufficient to sustain the indictment.
This decision has been called a four to three decision, but on the
principle that insurance is in fact interstate commerce, Mr. Justice
Jackson can be included with the majority of the court? 3 He refused
merely to do violence to existing controls over insurance, when in fact
Congress has taken no steps to establish federal regulation. The
conspiracy alleged could have been found to be a violation of the antitrust act because of its effect on interstate commerce without directly
deciding whether or not insurance is interstate commerce.' 4
10.

11.
12.

13.

14.

The Paul v. Virginia line of cases held that the mere issuing of
a policy of insurance takes place in one state and the mere
incidental use of the mails is not enough to constitute interstate
commerce; that the contracts are not subjects of trade and barter
offered in the market as something having an existence and value
of the parties to them. It is suggested that with the growth
of common carriers, expansion of the insurance business, and
change in methods of handling insurance sales and promotion,
insurance is in fact a necessary part of interstate commerce.
Fashion Originators Guild of America Inc. et al. v. Federal Trade
Commission, 312 U.S. 457, (1940); National Cotton Oil Co. v.
Texas, 197 U.S. 115, (1904).
Conspiracies under the Sherman Act are not dependent on the
"doing of any act other than the act of conspiring" as a condition of liability, Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, (1912).
Whatever may be its peculiar problems and characteristics, the
Sherman Act, so far as price-fixing agreements are concerned,
establishes one uniform rule applicable to all industries alike,
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, (1939).
The Paul v. Virginia line of cases were all in relation to attempts
to sustain state regulatory laws. Davis v. Department of Labor
and Industries, 317 U.S. 249, 255 (1942) recognized that certain
former decisions as to the dividing line between state and federal
power were illogical and theoretically wrong, but at the same
time, it announced that it would adhere to them because both
governments had accommodated the structure of their laws to
the error.
This decision of the Court should be read and considered along
with the decision handed down the same day in Polish National
Alliance of U.S. v. N.L.R.B. 322 U.S. 1196 (1944), in which the
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MASTER AND SERVANT
EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY FOR SERVANT'S NEGLIGENT
PEDESTRIANISM
A messenger boy, engaged in behalf of the Postal Telegraph Company, appellee, in the delivery of a telegram, negligently collided with
the appellant on a public sidewalk. Both parties to the accident were
pedestrians. In the appellant's action for personal injuries the trial
court sustained the appellee's demurer on the grounds that the messenger boy used his legs and the public sidewalk in hs own right,
which right was not and could not be delegated to him by the appellee,
and that the doctrine of "respondeat superior" had no application to
such a state of facts. Held, reversed. The applicability of "respondeat
superior" is tested by a determination of whether, at the time of the
injury, the employee is performing some duty within the scope of his
authority.,
By the doctrine of "respondeat superior"'2 a master is liable for
negligent acts 3 committed by his agents or servants acting in the
course of employment 4 or the line of duty.5 Realizing that the great
three dissenting judges in this case and Justice Rutledge (who
was of the opinion of the Court in this case), and Justice Reed
(who did not consider this case) held that labor di~putes among
insurance workers are subject to regulation by the National Labor
Relations Board because of the affect on interestate commerce.
Three judges concurring in the Polish Alliance case did so because
they believed insurance to be interstate commerce, and that the
regulation was justifiable because of this. However, the harm
to existing regulation had already been done in the South-Eastern
Underwriters case.
1. Anna L. Annis v. Postal Telegraph Co., Ind. App. , 52
N.E. (2d) 373 (1944).
2. Literally translated, "Let the principal answer."
3. It is often said that the master is liable whether the act of the
servant be negligent or willful and wanton. See Ah.bama Power
Co. v. Bodine, 213 Ala. 627, 105 So. 869, 870 (1925).
4. See Restatement, "Agency" (1933) § 228, where it is said that the
conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment, if (a) it
is the kind he is employed to perform, (b) it occurs substantially
within the authorized time and space limits and (c) ik is actuated,
at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master. E'ee also Note
(1943) 4 Ga. B. J. 45. However, it should be noted that the exact
meamng of an "act within the scope of employment" has always
been a mooted question.
5. This is the usual statement of the rule of "respondeat superior."
See Illinois Central R.R. et al. v. Hawkins, Administratrix, 66 Iad.
App. 312, 317, 318, 115 N.E. 613, 614 (1917). The Kentucky Supreme Court aptly states the reason for the doctrine as one of
public policy and necessity for holding a responsible person liable
for acts done by others in the prosecution of his business, as well
as for placing on employers an incentive to hire only careful employees. Johnson et al. v. Brewer, 266 Ky. 314, 317, 98 S.W. (2d)
889, 891 (1936). See William F. Barker v. Chicago, Peoria, & St.
Louis Ry., 243 Ill. 482, 488, 90 N.E. 1057, 1059, 26 L.R.A. (N.S.)
1058 (1909); Hantke v. Harris Ice Mach. Works, 152 Ore. 564,
54 P. (2d) 293, 295 (1936). See also Note (1942) 6 Md. L. Rev.
248, 249.

